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I.

INTRODUCTION

The law plays a significant role in all negotiations, regardless of the
context.1 The law can determine the who, what, when, where, and why of all
1.
See Lucas V.M. Bento, Preserving Negotiation Whilst Promoting Global
Order: Should We Bargain with Salt-Water Devils?, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 285, 297
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negotiations.2 Given the importance and power of law in the negotiation
context, adopting clear legal principles tailored to negotiations in specific
contexts will help willing and unwilling negotiators reach their desired
outcomes.3 Negotiation comes into play in a number of different areas, both
legal and otherwise.4
One venue where the negotiation principles used in legal and nonlegal areas coincide is the venue of ransom negotiations.5 Like other
negotiations, ransom negotiations feature adverse parties with competing
interests struggling to promote their own ends.6 With ransom negotiations,
however, the stakes are often much higher than a standard negotiation and
the party demanding the ransom payment has the opposing party at a distinct
disadvantage.7
Ransom negotiations take place fairly often in the contexts of piracy
and terrorism.8 Several laws and a wealth of experience have shaped how
negotiations in these contexts are able to progress.9
Insights into
negotiations in these contexts can be used to shape negotiations in favor of
the party facing a ransom demand in a different ransom context—the context
of cybercrime.10 Cybercriminals continue to develop new inventive means
of extorting valuable assets from computer users, including holding
computer systems hostage.11 Cybercriminals are employing viruses that lock
a computer user out of their own system and demand payment in return for
(2014); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal
Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 46 (1985); Alex J. Hurder, The Lawyer’s Dilemma: To Be
or Not to Be a Problem-Solving Negotiator, 14 CLINICAL L. REV. 253, 253–54 (2007).
2.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 25354.
3.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 253–54.
4.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 297; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46; Hurder,
supra note 1, at 253–54.
5.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, XTIUM,
http://www.xtium.com/beta/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Xtium_10-Minute-Guide-toRansomware-Protection.pdf (last visited May 2, 2017); Larry N. Zimmerman, Ransomware —
Your Data for Dollars, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2015, at 16, 16.
6.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 307–08.
7.
Id. at 308, 311; see also 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
8.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 299; Rivka Weill, Exodus: Structuring
Redemption of Captives, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 177, 180 (2014).
9.
Bento, supra note 1, at 297–98; Weill, supra note 8, at 180–81.
10.
GAVIN O’GORMAN & GEOFF MCDONALD, SYMANTEC, RANSOMWARE: A
GROWING MENACE 2 (2012); Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
11.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; Dean F. Sittig & Hardeep
Singh, A Socio-technical Approach to Preventing, Mitigating, and Recovering from
Ransomware Attacks, 2016 APPLIED CLINICAL INFORMATICS 624, 625.
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regained control of the system.12 To make matters worse, these viruses are
often capable of stealing private information from the captive computer as
the virus locks down the system.13 The healthcare industry, with its endless
amount of electronic private patient information and high-demand
environment, is especially at risk from the virus.14
This Article discusses the history, composition, and value of the
ransomware virus, as well as its impact on the healthcare industry.15 The
Article then moves to a discussion of negotiation and legal theories applied
to the contexts of piracy and terrorism.16 After analyzing the existing legal
framework of electronic private patient information in the healthcare
industry, along with the best practices to avoid cyberattacks in the first place,
negotiation theory is applied to the ransomware context to shed light on
whether healthcare organizations should be permitted to engage in ransom
negotiations with cybercriminals.17
II.

THE BASICS OF RANSOMWARE

Ransomware, as its name suggests, is a type of computer malware
designed to extort ransom payments from its targets.18 Ransomware acts by
infecting a computer, disabling the entire computer or disabling specific
programs or functions of the computer, and presenting a message on the
computer demanding a ransom payment in exchange for regaining the

12.
COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
HOW
TO
PROTECT
YOUR
NETWORKS
FROM
RANSOMWARE
2
(2016),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal-ccips/file/872771/download [hereinafter CCIPS WHITE
PAPER]; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
13.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
14.
Christiaan Beek, Healthcare Organizations Must Consider the Financial
Impact
of
Ransomware
Attacks,
MCAFEE
(Apr.
21,
2016),
http://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/executive-perspectives/healthcare-organizations-mustconsider-financial-impact-ransomware-attacks/; Mark Hagland, Special Report on Data
Security: With the Ransomware Crisis, the Landscape of Data Security Is Shifting,
HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS
(May
26,
2016),
http://www.healthcareinformatics.com/article/special-report-data-security-ransomware-crisis-landscape-datasecurity-shifting.
15.
See infra Part II.
16.
See infra Parts II, III.
17.
See infra Section IV.
18.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2; Alexandre Gazet, Comparative
Analysis of Various Ransomware Virii, 6 J. COMPUTER VIROLOGY & HACKING TECH. 77, 77
(2010).
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computer’s functionality.19 Ransomware has taken on many different forms
and has evolved since its birth many years ago.20
A.

The History of Ransomware

The original ransomware would infect a computer, encrypt certain
files in the computer so that the user could not open them without an
decryption key, and demand a ransom payment in exchange for the
decryption key.21 The modern day ransomware is capable of locking an
infected computer’s screen, rendering the computer useless to the user.22
The virus will then display a message demanding payment in exchange for
regained access to the computer.23 This modern form of ransomware is
believed to have originated near Russia.24 Instead of simply demanding a
ransom payment and disclosing the criminal nature of the screen lock, some
early forms of ransomware would instead display a message on the infected
computer purporting to be from Microsoft and claiming that in order to
activate the computer, the user must send a text message to a phone number
which would charge the user a premium charge for the text.25 The user
would thus be sending what he or she thought was a simple activation text to
Microsoft, but in reality his or her computer had been infected with
ransomware and the premium charge from the text message was being
collected by the hacker.26 Another early variant of the virus did not bother
with concealing the criminal nature of the ransom and instead of posing as a
representative of Microsoft, the hacker would simply display a pornographic
image on the user’s screen and lock the screen with the image on display.27
The hacker would then send a message demanding payment through a
similar premium charge phone call or text message as the Microsoft variant,
in exchange for removal of the pornographic image and regained computer
function.28 This version of ransomware was successful by shaming the
19.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; LYNNE DUNBRACK, IDC
HEALTH INSIGHTS, PROVIDING OUTSIDE-IN AND INSIDE-OUT PROTECTION AGAINST
RANSOMWARE AND OTHER INTENSIFYING CYBERTHREATS 2 (2016).
20.
See O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
21.
Id. at 3; see also CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
22.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER,
supra note 12, at 6.
23.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER,
supra note 12, at 2.
24.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 3.
25.
Id. at 4.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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computer’s user into paying the ransom and this version lasted for quite
some time.29
Starting around 2011, a new ransomware variant was introduced.30
The virus is similar to its predecessor in that the virus still locks the user’s
computer screen or locks the user out of specific computer files.31 The major
difference is in the content of the ransom message displayed on the computer
user’s screen.32 The new displayed messages claim to be from a government
agency, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), or from a local
law enforcement agency.33 The fake message would inform the user that his
or her computer had been locked because the user had committed a crime
and the only way to regain access would be to pay a fine for the crime. 34
Interestingly, some forms of the virus use accessible location services in
order to determine where the infected computer is located geographically.35
Determining where the computer is located allows the hacker to tailor the
ransom message to appear more legitimate, such as by ensuring the message
is written in the predominant language where the computer is located and by
displaying law enforcement images portraying the agencies existing in that
country.36 This new ransomware also abandoned the premium charge text
and phone method of collecting its ransoms.37 Modern ransomware hackers
now take advantage of online pre-payment methods, which act similarly to
online pre-paid visas.38 The computer user loads funds into an online
account, which the hacker has access to using his or her own credit card.39
The hacker then retrieves the funds and decides whether to unlock the
victim’s computer or dishonor their agreement.40
B.

How Does Ransomware Infect Computers?

Of course, in order to ever succeed in their goal of extorting a
ransom from their victims, hackers must first infect computers with the

16.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
Id.
Id.; Gazet, supra note 18, at 77; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
See O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4; see also Gazet, supra note 18, at 77; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at

35.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 5.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 4–5.
38.
Id. at 5.
39.
Id.
40.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 6; see also 10-Minute Guide
to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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ransomware virus.41 There are many different techniques used by hackers to
infect computers with the ransomware virus.42 One of the most common
methods used is referred to as a drive-by download.43 A drive-by download
occurs when the hacker has already gone through the process of hacking into
a website.44 The hacker then inserts hidden malware onto the website.45 An
unsuspecting person visiting the website will automatically be redirected to a
second website operated by the hacker, which installs the ransomware onto
the person’s computer.46 In order to hack into a website in the first place, the
website must have some type of vulnerability that the hacker can exploit.47
To avoid the hassle of exploiting an already existing weakness in a
website, some hackers legitimately buy advertising space on a website.48
The advertisement may purport to be promoting anything, but once the user
clicks on the advertisement, the user is directed to the hacker’s website
containing the ransomware virus.49
A different tactic used by hackers is referred to as spear phishing.50
Spear phishing is a hacking technique where the hacker sends a false email to
an employee of a company.51 The email may claim to be from the
employee’s coworker or supervisor and may instruct the employee to follow
a series of tasks, which would actually result in the employee infecting his or
her system with a virus, such as ransomware.52
Other means of infecting computers with the ransomware virus
include piggybacking the virus onto a different form of malware already
infecting a computer, or by sending out emails containing spam along with
the virus.53 Ransomware will often be paired with another form of malware
designed specifically to steal data and other information located on the
infected computer.54 Thus, while the ransomware virus locks the computer
41.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2; Hagland, supra note 14.
42.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 2.
43.
Id. at 4; see also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1.
44.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 4.
50.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1–2; Hagland, supra note 14; 10-Minute
Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
51.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; see
also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
52.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; see
also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
53.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 10; see also O’GORMAN & MCDONALD,
supra note 10, at 4.
54.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8.
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and demands ransom from the victims, the additional malware is stealing
data from the hostage computer.55
While the version of ransomware which requires a computer user to
click on a certain advertisement or email is still commonly used, newer
versions of the virus are being developed that rely on vulnerabilities in an
organization’s web server.56 If a healthcare organization’s web server is
unprotected or unpatched, hackers are able to exploit this weakness and
infiltrate the organization’s online network.57 Once inside the network, the
virus is able to move from the initial hacked computer to other computers
using the same network, collect login data and credentials from employee
staff, steal private stored data, and infect multiple systems with the
ransomware virus.58
C.

Ransomware and the Black-Market Economy

The earning prospects for cybercriminals using the ransomware virus
vary by country and by virus.59 In one study, a variant of the virus was
discovered to have infected 5700 computers in approximately one day.60 Of
this number, 168 users appear to have tried to free their computers by
entering a pin number, which is given to the user by the hacker after the user
pays the demanded ransom.61 The study demonstrated that the number of
users who potentially paid the ransom was approximately 2.9% of those
infected, the average amount demanded was $200, and that this would result
in the hackers extorting $33,600 in ransom payments in a single month using
this variant of the ransomware virus.62 Expanding this finding to an entire
year, the researchers concluded that an estimated $394,400 could be
transferred in ransom in an entire year with this virus if only 2.9% of the
yearly targets pay.63 As of the beginning of 2016, over 4000 cyberattacks
using the ransomware virus have occurred every single day on average.64
This number marks an increase of 300% when compared to the number of
attacks that occurred in 2015.65 While these numbers alone are sufficiently
55.
56.
note 10, at 4.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
Id.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2.
Id.
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significant to demonstrate the growing threat of ransomware, they may
represent only a fraction of the total sums extorted from organizations, as
many organizations do not report being attacked by ransomware hackers, nor
do they report paying the hacker a ransom.66
The ransomware virus is being used by hackers moderately to
aggressively target computers in the United States.67 Just as the virus itself
has evolved over time, so has its targets.68
D.

The Threat of Ransomware in the Healthcare Setting

Healthcare organizations are appealing targets to hackers.69 In 2015,
healthcare organizations were targeted by cybercriminals more than most
other industries.70 Some research suggests that on average, healthcare
organizations experience a cyberattack almost every single month.71 The
same research also suggests that nearly half of the healthcare organizations
involved in the study had experienced a cyberattack within the past twelve
months in which private patient information was at risk.72

66.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
There are a number of reasons why an organization may choose not to report an attack.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5. If word gets out that the organization was
successfully attacked or, even worse, that the organization paid a hacker’s ransom demands,
other cybercriminals may be encouraged to attack the organization upon seeing its willingness
to pay or upon discovering its cyber-vulnerability. Id. The organization that pays a
ransomware hacker may also be met with a negative reputation if word of the payment gets
out because the organization has indirectly financed criminal activity. Id.
67.
O’GORMAN & MCDONALD, supra note 10, at 9; 10-Minute Guide to
Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. In May of 2017, a series of ransomware
attacks worldwide resulted in hundreds of thousands of computer systems being infected from
over one-hundred countries. Ross Koppel & Harold Thimbleby, Lessons from the 100 Nation
Ransomware
Attack,
THE
HEALTH
CARE
BLOG
(May
14,
2017),
http://thehealthcareblog.com/blog/2017/05/14/lessons-from-the-100-nation-ransomwareattack/. The variant of the ransomware virus employed in these attacks has been labeled
“WannaCry” and is believed to have been developed based on vulnerabilities in Microsoft
operating systems, which were originally discovered by the U.S. National Security Agency.
Id.; David Goldman, Global Cyberattack: A Super-Simple Explanation of What’s Going on,
CNN (May 15, 2017), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/14/technology/global-cyberattackexplanation/index.html.
68.
Hagland, supra note 14.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
PONEMON INST., THE STATE OF CYBERSECURITY IN HEALTHCARE
ORGANIZATIONS IN 2016 (2016), http://cdn1.esetstatic.com/eset/US/resources/docs/whitepapers/State_of_Healthcare_Cybersecurity_Study.pdf.
72.
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2017

9

Nova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 5

358

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

The ransomware virus has been very effective at infecting healthcare
organizations.73 Between 2005 and 2014, $57.6 million in ransom payments
were made by healthcare organizations to ransomware hackers.74 During
these years, ransom payments to hackers ranged from $200 to $10,000.75
However, in the year of 2015 alone, approximately $24 million in ransom
payments were made by healthcare organizations to ransomware hackers.76
On February 12th, the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in
Hollywood, California fell prey to a ransomware attack.77 A doctor of the
medical center claimed that the medical center’s system “was being held for
ransom.”78 Later reports indicated that the health center had lost control of
its electronic health record system for longer than a week and that those
responsible demanded over $3 million in order to bring the medical center’s
system back online.79 The CEO for the hospital later revealed that the
medical center had paid approximately $17,000 to the hackers and the
hackers had honored their word and restored the medical center’s access to
their system.80 A March 28th incident revealed that integrated systems
storing health data were also at risk when a Columbia-based integrated
healthcare system was targeted by a ransomware virus.81 The system stored
information for ten hospitals and the information systems reportedly took
several weeks to restore while the hospitals attempted to function and care
for patients as best as possible.82 A single attack on a Maryland-based
hospital led to an $18,500 ransom payment.83
Healthcare organizations are an appealing target to data hackers.84
Patients’ electronic health records are worth far more than a victim’s credit
or debit card number.85 In fact, data indicates that electronic health records

73.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
74.
Id.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
Hagland, supra note 14.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
82.
Hagland, supra note 14.
83.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
84.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5; Beek, supra note 14; William Maruca, Hacked Health Records Prized for their Black
Market Value, FOX ROTHSCHILD LLP: HIPPA, HITECH & HIT (Mar. 16, 2015),
http://hipaahealthlaw.foxrothschild.com/2015/03/articles/articles/hacked-health-recordsprized-for-their-black-market-value/.
85.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5;
Kevin Lonergan, Why the Healthcare Industry Badly Needs a Cyber Security Health Check,
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may be worth ten times more to data hackers than a credit or debit card
number.86 In 2015, there was a larger volume of U.S. based ransomware
attacks than previously, specifically focusing on the healthcare industry. 87
Healthcare organizations may be so appealing to hackers because every
minute could literally be a matter of life and death, and every minute the
organization does not have full access to its electronic information, each
patient is at risk.88
As noted above, electronic health records are extremely valuable to
cyber hackers.89 Healthcare organizations are using and creating more
electronic healthcare data than ever before.90 Electronic healthcare data
allows healthcare providers different advantages to providing patients with
quality care; however, with more data being stored in an online format,
hackers have more targets and far more incentive to target the healthcare
industry.91
Healthcare organizations are storing “valuable financial,
insurance, and demographic data” which can be used, or sold to be used, to
commit identity theft.92
As an additional threat, hospital employees and medical staff are
now using their personal or organization-provided mobile devices in order to
access private patient health records stored on the organization’s servers.93
Alerts are sent to the mobile devices of healthcare staff to keep them
informed of patients’ vital statistics.94 Medical imaging machines are
connected to healthcare servers using the Internet.95 New technologies are
being developed that allow constant health monitoring of patients by
healthcare professionals, such as smart glasses.96 This constant stream of
private health information is recorded and digitally sent to the healthcare
organization’s servers where it becomes accessible to the monitoring
healthcare professional.97 Older technology, such as copy machines, are also
INFO. AGE (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.information-age.com/why-healthcare-industry-badlyneeds-cyber-security-health-check-123460052/; Maruca, supra note 84.
86.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5;
Lonergan, supra note 85; Maruca, supra note 84.
87.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
88.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 1–3.
89.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5; Lonergan, supra note 85; Maruca, supra note 84.
90.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2–3.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 2.
93.
Id. at 3.
94.
Id.
95.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 3.
96.
Id.
See id.
97.
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connected to the organization’s servers.98 Unfortunately, these technologies
are very vulnerable to cyberattacks.99 It seems that as the technology itself
boldly strides forward, the efforts to secure and protect the information being
sent by the technologies are left behind.100
E.
Using a Negotiation Theory Approach to Solving the Ransomware
Problem
Intelligent negotiation can aid in dispute-resolution without having
to deal with lengthy and costly conflicts.101 Negotiators employing what is
referred to as the problem-solving approach to negotiations appreciate the
costs and benefits of each side of the negotiation and seek to reach a
resolution beneficial to both sides.102 The problem-solving negotiator seeks
creative solutions to disputes that will satisfy, at least in part, the goals of
each party.103 Negotiation theory is an ideal framework from which to
analyze negotiations with ransomware hackers, as it takes into account the
costs and benefits of ransom negotiations, as well as considering other
external factors, such as the legal landscape surrounding the negotiation and
the human costs of ransom negotiations, which can aid negotiators dealing

98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 4. Hackers are already using these new technologies to breach
healthcare organization’s networks. See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 4. Connected
technologies including “insulin pumps, heart monitors, and picture archiving and
communication systems” have already been hacked in order to gain access to the connected
healthcare organization’s network. Id.
100.
Id. Ransomware hackers are able to use these new technologies as back
doors to gain access to a healthcare network. Id. The hacker no longer needs to find
vulnerabilities in the organization’s network itself, but instead hackers can breach the more
vulnerable healthcare technologies that are connected and transmitting information to the
network. Id. This type of back door hacking is known as medjacking. DUNBRACK, supra
note 19, at 4. After breaching the single, connected device, the hacker can use the virus to
infiltrate the organization’s network and move from system to system on the network,
infecting devices, and stealing information. See id. Once infected, cybercriminals could “take
. . . control of the [specific] device” itself, but this is uncommon, and hackers normally use
these devices as a means of gaining access to the more lucrative prize of the connected
organization’s network. Id. Healthcare organizations are woefully unprepared for this type of
threat as most organizations have not integrated these new technologies into their existing
security framework. See id.
101.
Hurder, supra note 1, at 254.
102.
Id. at 254, 273.
103.
CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT
11–12 (7th ed. 2012); see also SPENCER PUNNETT, REPRESENTING CLIENTS IN MEDIATION: A
GUIDE TO OPTIMAL RESULTS BASED ON INSIGHTS FROM COUNSEL, MEDIATORS, AND PROGRAM
ADMINISTRATORS 412 (2013); Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
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with ransomware hackers and other criminal hostage-takers to achieve
optimal results.104
III.

NEGOTIATING WITH PIRATES

Piracy poses a major threat across the globe to human life, the global
economy, and the environment.105 Pirates who engage in hostage-taking for
ransom payments put ransom negotiators in the position to save lives, while
trying not to financially benefit the pirates.106 Effective negotiation can
reduce these costs and creative legal strategies can reduce the incidence of
piracy worldwide.107
A.

Piracy in the Modern Age

Piracy has become an increasing problem over the past decade.108 In
2008, pirates committed or attempted roughly 293 attacks.109 In 2012, the
number of attacks increased to roughly 300.110 Pirates long ago realized that
simply to pillage and plunder a seized vessel was a wasted opportunity when
the vessel’s crew could be ransomed off for far more lucrative bounties.111
In fact, the ransoming of crewmembers has largely become the primary
motivation for modern-day pirates seizing maritime vessels.112 Between
2008 and early 2014, ransom payments exceeding $300 million had been
paid to pirates.113 In 2011, more than 1200 people were held for ransom by
pirates.114 Of this number, 35 of the hostages and 111 pirates died during the
process.115 Further, many piracy attacks never go reported at all, as ship
owners try to keep the attacks quiet in order to avoid increased insurance

104.
See CRAVER, supra note 103, at 11–12; PUNNETT, supra note 103, at 412;
Bento, supra note 1, at 305; Gifford, supra note 1, at 46.
105.
Daniel Pines, Maritime Piracy: Changes in U.S. Law Needed to Combat
this Critical National Security Concern, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 69, 71 (2012).
106.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 313–14, 321–22.
107.
See id. at 287–88, 292, 326; Hurder, supra note 1, at 254.
108.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 294.
109.
ICC Int’l Maritime Bureau [IMB], Privacy and Armed Robbery Against
Ships: Report for the Period 1 January–31 December 2012, at 5–6 (Jan. 2013).
110.
Id.
111.
Bento, supra note 1, at 287, 304.
112.
Id. at 287.
113.
Paul Redfern, Over $300m Paid in Ransom to Pirates Since 2008, THE E.
AFR. (Feb. 9, 2013, 8:40 PM), http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Over-USD300m-paid-inransom-to-pirates-since-2008/2558-1689648-jxsa4h/index.html.
114.
ICC IMB, supra note 109, at 24.
115.
Id.
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premiums.116 While the costs of human life and ransom payments may be
the most prominent costs of piracy, there are also secondary costs involved in
piracy situations, such as the costs to deliver the ransom, to repair damaged
vessels, to replace stolen cargo, to pay for legal services, etc.117 The pirates’
course is simple: Seize the vessel while ensuring its continued navigability
and seize the crew in order to maximize the pirates’ expected return for their
efforts.118 The negotiation phase begins here and the stakes could not be
higher: The lives of the sailors.119
B.

The Piracy Ransom Negotiation Context

Recent history is replete with graphic examples of negotiations with
pirates gone bad for many of the same reasons negotiations in the business or
legal setting turn sour—miscommunication, refusal to cooperate, delayed
payments, an aggressive negotiation style, technical difficulties, etc.120 In
2011, Somali pirates seized and killed four American sailors when
negotiations fell apart between the pirates and the U.S. Navy. 121 The next
year, Somali pirates killed a sailor over the delay of a ransom payment.122
Grisly illustrations of negotiations with pirates gone south tend to
cloud the public’s perception of how pirates view these transactions: It is
only business.123 From a pirate’s perspective, ransoming sailors is nothing
more than a matter of financial gain.124 This is one of the major details
separating the pirate from the terrorist.125 Although ransom situations may
result in harm or death to the hostage crew, such situations may also
conclude with the successful release of the hostages after the ransom is
paid.126 In 2012, pirates attacked a Greek vessel and held its crew for

116.
Bento, supra note 1, at 293.
117.
Id. at 291.
118.
See Yvonne M. Dutton & Jon Bellish, Refusing to Negotiate: Analyzing
the Legality and Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 299, 301, 305–
06 (2014).
119.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 291.
120.
See id. at 287–88.
121.
Id.
122.
Id. at 288; see also Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 301.
123.
See Pines, supra note 105, at 73–74, 78.
124.
See id. at 78.
125.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 303–04.
126.
See Barry Hart Dubner & Kimberly Chavers, The Dilemma of Piratical
Ransoms: Should They Be Paid or Not? On the Human Rights of Kidnapped Seamen and
Their Families, 18 BARRY L. REV. 297, 300 (2013); Thaine Lennox-Gentle, Piracy, Sea
Robbery, and Terrorism: Enforcing Laws to Deter Ransom Payments and Hijacking, 37
TRANSP. L.J. 199, 200 (2010). Between January and December of 2012, approximately 585
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ransom.127 The pirates successfully ransomed the crew for $5 million and
accordingly spared the crew.128 If pirates never intend to make good on their
ransom deals, they would eventually cease to exist because ransoms would
no longer be paid.129
The ransoms negotiated by pirates provide a means of financial
support to both the pirate and to the local economy of the pirate’s
community.130 The correlation between dismal local economic conditions
and piracy provides insight into a pirate’s motivations.131 While the pirates’
actions are certainly deplorable, ignoring their motivations is a critical
mistake for the negotiator on the other side of the table.132
Attorney Lucas V.M. Bento distinguishes between three different
interests at play in ransom negotiations with pirates.133 Non-pecuniary
interests are those involving “the well-being of hostages during captivity,
their safe release and post-incident care.”134 Pecuniary interests are those
involved in recovering the vessel and its cargo.135 Lastly, hybrid interests are
a combination of the first two interests.136 Bento explains that, although the
majority of ransom negotiations involve hybrid interests, non-pecuniary
interests tend to be more concerning.137
Beyond the financial and non-financial interests at stake in pirate
ransom negotiations, understanding the nature and complexity of pirate
organizations is vital to reaching desired outcomes.138 Pirate organizations
can vary in their sophistication just like other criminal syndicates.139 The
pirates physically present and boarding their target vessels may not have the
clout in a negotiation to make decisions on behalf of the pirate
sailors were held as hostages by pirates. Dubner & Chavers, supra, at 300. Of this total
number, the pirates killed six of the sailors, leaving the remaining sailors alive. Id.
127.
Bento, supra note 1, at 295.
128.
Id.
129.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 301.
130.
See id. at 305–06.
131.
See Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 298–99; Lennox-Gentle, supra
note 126, at 205; Pines, supra note 105, at 77–78.
132.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at
205; Jennifer W. Reynolds, Breaking BATNAS: Negotiation Lessons from Walter White, 45
N.M. L. REV. 611, 612 (2015).
133.
Bento, supra note 1, at 291. Lucas V.M. Bento is an attorney based in
New York specializing in international disputes and arbitration. Id. at 285 n.*.
134.
Id. at 291.
135.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
Bento, supra note 1, at 291.
138.
See Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 205.
139.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 306; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126,
at 205–06.
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organization.140 For the negotiator opposing the pirates, it is paramount to
discover whether the pirates involved in the discussion have the authority to
make flexible decisions or whether they are strictly following a preconceived
plan with no option to deviate.141 Shedding light on all of the inner workings
of a pirate organization is often impossible, but by putting in the effort to
learn as much about the organization as possible, the opposing negotiator can
increase the chances of arriving at a desired outcome.142
C.

Arguments Against Paying Ransoms to Pirates

International state actors differ in their approaches to addressing the
problem of negotiating with and paying ransoms to pirates.143 Many nations,
including the United States, France, Britain, Columbia, and Italy, as a matter
of policy, oppose paying ransoms to pirates to free hostages, however these
countries do not make the payment of pirate ransoms illegal.144 Somalia has
illegalized the payment of ransoms to pirates.145 The opponents of paying
ransoms to pirates contend that giving in to ransom demands only emboldens
the pirates and encourages them to commit similar acts in the future because
the pirates know their demands will be met.146 Further, opponents believe
that paying ransoms indirectly funds the enterprise of piracy, thus giving the
same pirates the means to conduct additional operations.147 An argument
against paying a pirate’s ransom demands, often employed by the United
States, is that piracy is commonly intertwined with other international
crimes, such as terrorism.148 While international terrorism is a separate
international crime from piracy, paying a ransom demand in response to one
crime may end up resulting in the other.149
In 2010, former President of the United States, Barack Obama,
issued an executive order banning any financial transactions with certain
140.
See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 305–06.
141.
See id. at 301, 306; Pines, supra note 105, at 78.
142.
See Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 205.
143.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
317–22; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 206–07.
144.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
320–22; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 206.
145.
Somalia: Six Jailed for ‘Pirate Ransom’ Cash, BBC (June 20, 2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13826050; see also Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89.
146.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
10.
147.
Bento, supra note 1, at 289; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
310.
148.
Bento, supra note 1, at 290; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 215.
149.
Bento, supra note 1, at 290; Lennox-Gentle, supra note 126, at 214–15.
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Somali organizations, some of which had ties to pirate gangs.150 The United
Kingdom (“U.K.”) similarly criminalizes ransom payments made to pirate
gangs with sufficient links to terrorist organizations.151 Thus, although very
few state actors go as far as to illegalize ransom payments to pirates, some
states ban these payments if there is a threat that the funds may end up in
terrorist hands.152 The economic success of piracy has led to a pirate stock
exchange, through which individual or corporate investors are actually
investing in and receiving a cut of ransom payments given to pirates.153
Paying ransoms to pirates may encourage the growth of and continued
investments to the industry of piracy globally.154
D.

Arguments in Favor of Paying Ransoms to Pirates

The maritime industry, however, has expressed concern that an
outright ban on ransom payments would put sailors’ lives at risk and
significantly hamper the industry as a whole.155 After all, what sailor would
be interested in traversing pirate-infested waters with the knowledge that, if
taken for ransom, nobody would be answering the call?156 Proponents of
paying ransoms to spare the lives of hostages also note that, even if ransom
payments are made illegal, pirates may simply amplify their violence toward
hostages in order to compel the sailors’ family membersas well as ship
owners—to make the illegal ransom payments.157
E.

Negotiation Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Piracy Context

Many scholars argue against an absolute ban on negotiations with
pirates.158 The varying interests of all parties involved should be weighed in

150.
151.

Bento, supra note 1, at 290.
CHATHAM HOUSE, PIRACY AND LEGAL ISSUES: RECONCILING PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INTERESTS 15 (2009).
152.
See Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 320, 322; Lennox-Gentle, supra
note 126, at 214–15.
153.
Avi Jorisch, Today’s Pirates Have Their Own Stock Exchange, WALL
STREET
J.
(June
16,
2011),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304520804576341223910765818.
154.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 306–07.
155.
Id. at 313–14; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
156.
See Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
157.
See ADJOA ANYIMADU, CHATHAM HOUSE, COORDINATING AN
INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE PAYMENT OF RANSOMS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR REDUCING
RANSOM PAYMENTS 8 (2012); Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at 319.
158.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126, at
327.
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order to assess the potential payoffs of each approach to the problem.159 The
options available to governments and private parties or corporations facing
ransom demands are either to pay the ransom or not to pay the ransom. 160
The options available to pirates demanding ransom are either to release the
hostages or not to release the hostages.161 Of these potential options, there is
only one possible solution that benefits both parties: Where the government
or private party pays the ransom and the pirates release the hostages.162 If the
private party chooses not to pay the ransom and, by some miracle, the pirates
choose to release the hostages unharmed, the private party will have
achieved its goal in the negotiation, whereas the pirates’ goal will have been
thwarted.163 If the private party pays the ransom, but the pirates do not
release the hostages, or if the pirates kill the hostages, then the private party
will have been thwarted, and the pirates will have achieved their goal.164
Lastly, if the private party chooses not to pay the ransom and the pirates
choose not to release the crew—a scenario seen often—then neither party
will have achieved their goals.165
While this framework provides a view of the competing interest of
the parties, it is insufficient on its own to shed light on an appropriate policy
regarding paying ransoms to pirates.166 First, each option cannot be given
equal weight, since the outcome in which the private party does not pay the
ransom and the pirates release the hostages is unlikely; the outcome in which
the private party pays the ransom and the pirates do not release the hostages
is, at least, somewhat likely; and the situation where the private party pays
the ransom and the pirates release the hostages can hardly be said to be an
absolute win for the private party.167 The private party is already at a loss for
having to negotiate with pirates to begin with, and thus, the parties are on
unequal footing going into the negotiation.168 A key argument against
paying ransoms is to prevent the funding of future criminal activity, a
159.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
164.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
165.
Id. In 2010, seven crewmembers were held hostage by pirates aboard the
vessel, the Iceberg 1, for 800 days while the pirates’ demands for ransom went ignored. See
Why David Cameron Will Not Stop Somali Pirates Getting Their Pieces of Eight,
COLINFREEMANSITE
(Sept.
6,
2012),
http://www.colinfreemansite.wordpress.com/2012/09/06/why-david-cameron-will-not-stopsomali-pirates-getting-their-pieces-of-eight/. During this time, one of the crewmembers
committed suicide. Id. The situation was resolved by military intervention. Id.
166.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330.
167.
See id.
168.
See id.
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response to which this analysis does not provide.169 However, completely
banning private parties from paying ransoms to pirates could likely result in
loss of life and remove that important option from the private party
negotiator.170
This struggle between two options, which many perceive as
unacceptable, has led scholars to propose more creative solutions to the
problem.171 A starting proposal argues that while private parties should be
permitted to negotiate with and pay ransoms to pirates, state actors, such as
the United States and the U.K., should have an absolute non-negotiation
policy.172 That approach ensures state actors take a stance against the actions
of pirates and, ideally, will work toward reducing and eliminating the source
of the problem, piracy itself.173 Another solution is to permit private parties
to pay ransoms to pirates, but to tax the ransom payments.174 The benefits of
this solution are twofold: First, additional funds are raised which can be
applied toward combatting piracy; and second, those in charge of the ships at
risk will be incentivized to take extra care to prevent these situations from
occurring and protecting their vessels as best as possible.175 The detriment of
this solution is that victims of piracy are essentially being taxed for paying to
spare the lives of their crew.176 A further solution proposes holding shipowners liable to their crew for failing to properly safeguard them from
pirates.177 The United States already permits sailors to sue ship-owners for
negligence in situations involving pirate raids and for sending sailors into
areas the owners know are plagued by pirate attacks.178 Another solution
would be to require ship-owners to employ guards on voyages through

27.

169.
170.
171.

See id. at 327; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 313.
Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 314.
Bento, supra note 1, at 330–33; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 324–

172.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 330 n.278.
173.
Id.
174.
Id. at 331.
175.
Id. This solution also provides a silver lining to those opponents of
paying any type of ransom to criminal pirates, in that the pirates who hold sailors for ransom
are indirectly supporting the efforts to end piracy. Id. at 332. When private parties pay
ransoms to pirates—in a sense rewarding pirates for their criminal activity—these ransom
payments will then be taxed, and the proceeds will contribute to government efforts aimed at
stopping piracy. Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
176.
Id. at 331. An additional downside of this approach is that private
companies paying ransoms for the release of their crew will be faced with an incentive not to
report the incident at all in order to avoid being taxed on the ransom payment. Id. at 332.
177.
Id. at 331.
178.
Id. at 331–32.
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pirate-infested waters.179 In 2009, the U.S. Coast Guard required ships
traveling in dangerous areas near Africa to employ guards.180
Negotiating with pirates need not feature an all-or-nothing outlook,
in which a party either closes off from negotiations or where a party pays
every ransom.181 A cost-benefit analysis should be conducted during every
negotiation to ensure that the negotiator is able to maximize its benefits,
minimize its losses, and weigh context-based factors accordingly.182 The
ransom negotiator must also consider governmental efforts to curb piracy,
such as taxes on ransom payments and ship-owner liability.183
IV.

NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORISTS

Terrorists frequently participate in kidnapping to bankroll their other
terrorist activities.184 Ransoming off victims of terrorist kidnappings is
highly lucrative and reports in recent years indicate that terrorists are
receiving higher ransom rewards than in the past.185 Newer terrorist
organizations, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (“ISIL”), have
used the tactic with great success and have shed light on the different
approaches taken by various countries in dealing with ransom negotiations
with terrorists.186

at 612.

179.
180.
181.

See Bento, supra note 1, at 331.
Id.
See id. at 326; Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132,

182.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62;
Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612.
183.
Bento, supra note 1, at 331; see also Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at
325–27.
184.
Sima Kazmir, The Law, Policy, and Practice of Kidnapping for Ransom in
a Terrorism Context, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 325, 326 (2015); Weill, supra note 8, at
180–81.
185.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 326. The New York Times conducted a 2014
study demonstrating the growth in terrorist ransom payments. Rukmini Callimachi, Paying
Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/world/africa/ransoming-citizens-europe-becomes-alqaedas-patron.html?_r=0. In 2003, Al Qaeda was ransoming hostages at an average of
$200,000 per hostage. Id. Compare this with 2008 where two Canadian hostages were
ransomed for $1 million, and with 2013 where four French hostages were ransomed for $40
million. Id. The New York Times study concluded that between 2008 and 2015 Al Qaeda,
and its supporting organizations, have made approximately $125 million through hostage
negotiations and ransom payments. Id.
186.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 327. In 2014, ISIL had been paid
approximately $20 million in ransom payments by various countries. David S. Cohen, Under
Sec’y of the Treasury for Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, Remarks at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace: Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation (Oct. 23, 2014).
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The Heightened Interest of International Terrorism

When it comes to making ransom payments to terrorist
organizations, there seems to be a heightened interest at play compared to
paying ransoms to other brands of criminal organizations.187 This could be
due to the intense hostility toward terrorism and the heightened threat
communities tend to perceive when confronted with terrorism.188 In recent
years, questions surrounding the wisdom of paying ransoms to terrorists have
been thrust to the forefront of public attention, given the rise of ISIL.189 ISIL
is known to have taken hostages from at least twelve different countries,
including the United States, England, Italy, Russia, France, Denmark,
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, and Belgium.190 Many of these hostages have
been ransomed and returned to their respective countries, while others are
still being held by the organization.191 The threat posed by international
terrorism has led to it generally being treated as a heightened interest in
terms of ransom and other laws.192 The heightened interest is utilized as a
policy argument in support of an outright ban on ransom payments to
terrorist organizations, whereas, in other criminal enterprises, an outright ban
on cooperative efforts is typically shied away from.193
Countries have taken different approaches to the problem of
negotiating with and paying ransoms to terrorist organizations.194 This
patchwork of differing laws and policies is complicated further by
international legal entities, such as the United Nations (“U.N.”), which also
has set forth extensive resolutions on the issue.195

187.
Weill, supra note 8, at 184–85.
188.
Id.
189.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 327.
190.
See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & U.N. ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR IR., REPORT ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT IN IRAQ: 6
JULY10 SEPTEMBER 2014 3 (2014); Jethro Mullen, How Many More Western Captives is ISIS
Holding?, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/15/world/meast/isis-western-captives/ (last
updated Sept. 15, 2014); Karen Yourish, The Fates of 23 ISIS Hostages in Syria, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/10/24/world/middleeast/the-fateof-23-hostages-in-syria.html?_r=0.
191.
See Mullen, supra note 190; Yourish, supra note 190.
192.
Bento, supra note 1, at 301–04; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 319–
20.
193.
Bento, supra note 1, at 301–04; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 319–
20.
194.
See Kazmir, supra note 184, at 328, 337–40.
195.
See id. at 329.
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The International Law of Paying Ransoms to Terrorists

The U.N. and other international legal entities have taken the broad,
outward position that ransom payments should generally be banned.196
However, this position, along with the resolutions passed by U.N. memberstates, are not binding under international law.197 In 2009, the U.N. passed
Security Council Resolution 1904, which mandates that U.N. member-states
freeze funds and assets in order to prevent ransom payments, but the
resolution did not explicitly ban paying ransoms to terrorists.198 Security
Council Resolution 2133, which was passed in 2014, required states to
prohibit terrorist organizations from “benefiting directly or indirectly from
ransom payments.”199 Finally, in 2015, the U.N. passed Security Council
Resolution 2199, which prohibits member-states from paying ransoms to
terrorist organizations.200 Security Council Resolution 2199 is surprisingly
broad in its scope, in that the resolution prohibits the payment of any ransom
payment by anyone, “regardless of how or by whom the ransom is paid,” to a
terrorist organization listed on a designated list of sanctioned terrorist
organizations.201 Despite the seemingly clear stance the U.N. has taken in its
approach to paying ransoms to terrorists, its resolutions have not resulted in
any prosecutions of either state-members or private individuals who have
made ransom payments to prohibited terrorist organizations.202
The laws and policies supported by individual countries regarding
ransom payments are far more complicated than the U.N.’s approach and
send an inconsistent international approach to ransom payments.203 Some
countries, including the United States and the U.K. strongly oppose the
practice of paying ransoms to terrorists.204 On the other hand, there are
countries, including Germany and France, which publicly take a stance
against paying terrorist ransom demands, but have allegedly made such
payments.205
196.
Id. at 329–30.
197.
Id. at 329.
198.
S.C. Res. 1904, ¶ 1(a) (Dec. 17, 2009); The Threat Posed by Kidnapping
for Ransom by Terrorists and the Preventive Steps the International Community Can Take,
GOV.UK
(June
18,
2013),
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/207542/Kidnapp
ing-for-ransom.pdf.
199.
S.C. Res. 2133, ¶ 3 (Jan. 27, 2014).
200.
S.C. Res. 2199, ¶ 19 (Feb. 12, 2015).
201.
Id.
202.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 337.
203.
Id.
204.
Id. at 337–38.
205.
Id. at 338; Yourish, supra note 190. France has actually made it illegal to
provide financial, or other support, to terrorist organizations and it is unclear if French citizens
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The U.S. Approach to Paying Ransoms to Terrorists

The United States takes the approach of banning ransom payments to
terrorists and has tried to dissuade individual citizens from making such
payments.206 Families of U.S. hostages have accused the U.S. government of
threatening them with legal prosecution if the families attempted to pay
terrorists’ ransom demands to secure the return of their family members. 207
In response to such accusations, the U.S. government has stated that it does
not engage in threatening the families of hostages being held by terrorist
groups, but claims it has a policy of informing such families of the laws in
place that prevent the government or private U.S. citizens from making
ransom payments to terrorist groups.208 This dissuasion has led to some
controversy between the U.S. government and U.S. citizens who want the
government to support the release of their family members being held
hostage.209
The Patriot Act is the legal instrument through which paying
ransoms to terrorist organizations may be deemed illegal in the United
States.210 Section 2339B of the Patriot Act makes it unlawful for any person
to knowingly provide material support to terrorist organizations.211 This
section imposes a prison sentence of between fifteen years to life for
would be prosecuted for paying terrorists’ ransom demands in order to secure the release of
their hostage family members. CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] [PENAL CODE] art. 421-2-2 (Fr.).
206.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 338–39; Brian Ross et al., ‘So Little
Compassion’: James Foley’s Parents Say Officials Threatened Family Over Ransom, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:58 PM), http://www.abcnews.go.com/International/governmentthreatened-foley-family-ransom-payments-mother-slain/story?id=25453963.
207.
Michael Isikoff, Sotloff’s Parents Told They Could Be Prosecuted for
Paying Ransom to IS, YAHOO NEWS (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.yahoo.com/news/sotloff-sparents-were-told-they-could-be-prosecuted-for-paying-ransom-to-is-234329991.html?ref=gs;
Paula Mejia, U.S. Threatened James Foley’s Family Over ISIS Ransom Demand, His Mother
Says, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:16 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/us-threatened-jamesfoleys-family-over-isis-ransom-demand-270151. The families of two U.S. citizens, James
Foley and Steven Sotloff, held hostage by ISIL, both reported being threatened with criminal
prosecution by the U.S. government if they attempted to pay ISIL’s ransom demands in
exchange for their family members. Isikoff, supra; Mejia, supra.
208.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 339–40; Mejia, supra note 207.
209.
Family Releases Statement on Death of Warren Weinstein in U.S.
Operation, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/04/23/family-releases-statement-on-death-of-warren-weinstein-in-u-soperation/?utm_term=.7a897b402cf9. Warren Weinstein was a U.S. citizen taken hostage by
al-Qaeda. Id. Weinstein was killed by a drone strike conducted by the United States, while
Weinstein was being held by the terrorist group. Id. Weinstein’s wife would later express her
desire for a more consistent approach by the U.S. government in aiding hostages and
supporting their families. Id.
210.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
211.
Id. § 2339B(a)(1).
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violations, depending on whether any loss of life results from the
violation.212 To violate section 2339B of the Act, the person providing
material support must do so knowing that he or she is providing support to a
terrorist organization.213 Further, the violator must provide material support,
which can be monetary support, training, advice, etc.214 While there is
nothing illegal under this section with the U.S. government or a private
citizen having a conversation, or even negotiating with a terrorist
organization, providing support—such as through a ransom payment—would
violate this section of the Patriot Act.215 However, section 2339C of the
Patriot Act prohibits financing terrorism, attempting to finance terrorism, or
conspiring to finance terrorism.216 Thus, under section 2339C, the U.S.
government or the family of a hostage may violate the Patriot Act by
negotiating with terrorists under the Attempts and Conspiracy provisions of
section 2339C.217 This section, however, does include a heightened intent
requirement, mandating that a violator of the section must intend that his or
her support be used for terrorist activities.218 If negotiations are permitted by
section 2339C, the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations would be a
violation of both sections 2339B and 2339C.219
D.

Insurance Policies Covering Ransom Payments to Terrorists

To offset the high prices of negotiation and ransom payments, some
insurance companies offer kidnapping and ransom (“K&R”) insurance.220
These policies can cover a number of aspects in ransom negotiations,
including fees necessary for consultations, any money lost while actually
recovering the hostage, and the ransom payment itself.221 While it is unclear
how various countries will treat K&R insurance policies that seemingly flout
212.
Id.
213.
Id. However, in order for a violation to occur, it is not necessary that the
person providing support knowingly further the terrorist activities of the terrorist organization.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 16 (2010); United States v. Al Kassar, 660
F.3d 108, 12930 (2d Cir. 2011). All that is necessary to violate the provision is that the
person providing the support knew that their support was being given to a terrorist
organization. Holder, 561 U.S. at 16–17.
214.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1), (g)(4).
215.
Id. § 2339B(a)(1); Kazmir, supra note 184, at 346.
216.
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(2).
217.
Id.; Kazmir, supra note 184, at 347.
218.
18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1).
219.
Id. § 2339B–C.
220.
Meadow Clendenin, “No Concessions” with No Teeth: How Kidnap and
Ransom Insurers and Insureds Are Undermining U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 741, 750 (2006).
221.
Id. at 751–52.
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laws by illegally providing financial support to terrorists, such as the Patriot
Act, the U.K. has designed legislation intended to criminalize such
policies.222
E.

Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Terrorism Context

The United States’ rationale for banning ransom payments to
terrorists is that doing so would place U.S. citizens at an even higher risk of
being targeted as hostages by terrorist organizations.223 The idea behind the
argument in favor of an outright ban on paying ransoms to terrorists is that
making such payments would only incentivize and legitimize the practice of
hostage-taking and indirectly fund the terrorists’ operations.224 The
downside to this argument is that placing a blanket ban on ransom payments
reduces a ransom negotiator’s flexibility to employ that option, which tends
to result, as we often see, in a state actor or international entity paying the
ransom anyway in direct violation of its own policy. 225 Closing the door
entirely on negotiations cuts off any possibility of engaging in conversations
that may prove beneficial from a cost-benefit perspective for the ransom
negotiator.226
An approach that attempts to remedy this issue is referred to as a
process-structural approach.227 This approach is designed to “take the
specific individual into consideration, while bolstering his or her bargaining
power and reducing terrorists’ incentives to kidnap.”228 First, this approach
to dealing with terrorists’ ransom demands is to be set out by statute to
ensure the public understands their government’s approach to dealing with
the issue.229 Next, any decision to accept or decline a ransom demand must
be met with the approval of the Executive Branch and a majority of the
Legislative Branch.230 Deliberations over whether or not to accept the
demand are to be conducted in private and the government will simply
222.
Kazmir, supra note 184, at 357; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B–C; Sarah
Veysey, U.K. Terrorism Bill Proposes Ban on Insurance Coverage of Ransom Payments, BUS.
INS.
(Dec.
7,
2014,
12:00
AM),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20141207/NEWS07/141209865?tags.
223.
Press Briefing by the Press Secretary, 11/18/2014, WHITE HOUSE (Nov.
18, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/18/press-briefingpress-secretary-11182014.
224.
Weill, supra note 8, at 192, 196.
225.
See id. at 202–05.
226.
Id. at 205.
227.
See id. at 217.
228.
Id.
229.
Weill, supra note 8, at 211, 217.
230.
Id. at 218. The theory is designed to aid democratic governments in
addressing the issue of ransom demands by terrorists. Id.
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answer whether they accept or decline the ransom demand. 231 The families
of the hostages are to be given a hearing on the matter, during which the
families can make their own case for paying or not paying the ransom.232
The goal of this approach is to maximize a government’s bargaining power
by conducting closed-door discussions over whether the ransom deal would
be to the country’s advantage, while at the same time giving the entire
ransom negotiation process uniformity, structure, and fairness to the hostages
and their families.233 Such a policy may give ransom negotiators enough
flexibility to maximize the return for their party’s interests, minimize their
costs, and save lives.234
V.

NEGOTIATING WITH RANSOMWARE HACKERS

Although never having to engage with a ransomware hacker is the
best-case scenario, many healthcare organizations find themselves having to
do so following a successful attack.235 Ransom negotiators working on
behalf of healthcare organizations in the face of a ransomware attack must
deal with the same principles as ransom negotiators in other contexts:
Maximizing benefits while minimizing costs, accounting for victim-based
factors, and remaining in compliance with existing legal boundaries.236
A.
The Existing Legal Framework for Ransomware Negotiations: The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
HIPAA has become synonymous with private patient healthcare
information.237 HIPAA is intertwined with the threat posed by ransomware
because the virus may steal electronic private patient information from
healthcare providers.238 A ransomware attack may rise to the level of a
breach under HIPAA if the hacker actually obtains the protected patient

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 220.
Id. at 225.
See Weill, supra note 8, at 220, 225, 230.
See id. at 217.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2, 7.
Id. at 5, 7; Weill, supra note 8, at 217, 225.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF
THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY
HIPAA 1, 3 (2016).
238.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 2; Zimmerman, supra note 5,
at 16.
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information, which would be an unpermitted disclosure “which compromises
the security or privacy of the protected [personal] health information.”239
1.

Who Is Covered by HIPAA?

As a starting point, HIPAA only governs “covered entities and
business associates.”240
Covered entities include doctors, clinics,
psychologists, dentists, chiropractors, nursing homes, and pharmacies that
transmit electronic information.241 Covered entities also include health
insurance companies, HMOs, employment-based health plans, Medicare,
Medicaid, other government health insurance programs, and healthcare
clearinghouses.242 These covered entities must abide by HIPAA’s numerous
provisions and they may also be held liable under certain HIPAA
provisions.243
2.

The HIPAA Privacy Rule

The HIPAA Privacy Rule creates national standards designed to
protect private health information.244 The Privacy Rule applies to a certain
type of information, known as protected health information.245 Protected
health information, also referred to as individually identifiable health
information, is information relating to: “[T]he individual’s past, present, or
future physical or mental health or condition; the provision of healthcare to
the individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision of
healthcare to the individual,” which either identifies the specific person or
which can reasonably identify that person.246
Individually identifiable health information cannot be used by
covered entities for any reason other than reasons allowed in the Privacy
Rule or if the individual, whose information is at issue authorizes, in writing,
the information to be used for specific purposes.247 The information cannot
239.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2015); see also CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12,
at 2; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
240.
Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last visited
May 2, 2017).
241.
Id.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
244.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF
THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2003).
245.
Id.
246.
Id. at 3–4; see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
247.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
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be disclosed by covered entities unless it is disclosed to the actual
individuals, upon request, or to certain government agencies if there is an
ongoing investigation.248 Covered entities also may use or disclose this
information for the organization to treat, pay, and conduct other healthcare
activities.249
Treatment includes “the provision, coordination, or
management of healthcare and related services for an individual by one or
more healthcare providers, including consultation between providers
regarding a patient and referral of a patient by one provider to another.”250
Payment includes
activities of a health plan to obtain premiums, determine or fulfill
responsibilities for coverage and provision of benefits, and furnish
or obtain reimbursement for healthcare delivered to an
individual and activities of a healthcare provider to obtain payment
or be reimbursed for the provision of healthcare to an
251
individual.

Healthcare operations include several actions, such as:
(a) quality assessment and improvement activities,
including case management and care coordination; (b) competency
assurance activities, including provider or health plan performance
evaluation, credentialing, and accreditation; (c) conducting or
arranging for medical reviews, audits, or legal services, including
fraud and abuse detection and compliance programs; (d) specified
insurance functions, such as underwriting, risk rating, and
reinsuring risk; (e) business planning, development, management,
and administration; and (f) business management and general
administrative activities of the entity, including but not limited to:
[D]e-identifying protected health information, creating a limited
data set, and certain fundraising for the benefit of the covered
252
entity.

Further, the Privacy Rule requires covered entities to implement
safeguards designed to ensure individually identifiable health information
248.
45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(2) (2005); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS.,
supra note 244, at 4.
249.
45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1)(i)–(ii) (2005); U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN.
SERVS., supra note 244, at 4–5.
250.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501 (2005).
251.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501.
252.
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN. SERVS., supra note 244, at 5; see also 45
C.F.R. § 164.501.
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remains private and is not made public intentionally or unintentionally.253
Individuals also can request that covered entities restrict access to their
individually identifiable health information strictly for the purposes of
treatment, payment, and other healthcare activities.254
If a covered entity fails to abide by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, it may be
subject to civil monetary penalties.255 Penalties can range from $100 to over
$50,000, with an annual cap on the amount an organization may be penalized
of $1,500,000.256 The penalty imposed depends on the circumstances of the
privacy breach, including any possible intent or negligence on the part of the
covered entity in regard to the privacy breach.257 If the organization was not
willfully negligent in regard to the privacy breach and the organization
remedied the breach within thirty days of the organization discovering the
breach or within thirty days of the day the organization should have known
of the breach, then a civil penalty will not be imposed.258 Criminal penalties
also may be imposed for intentional breaches of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
which ranges depending upon the circumstances of the breach, with more
egregious violations, such as violations committed with commercial motives,
often resulting in penalties.259
3.

The HIPAA Security Rule

The HIPAA Security Rule mandates that entities covered by the Act
implement measures that can work to lower an entity’s risk of any
cyberattack.260 The Security Rule applies to a specific type of protected
health information, referred to as “electronic protected health
information.”261 Electronic protected health information is protected health
information transmitted by the organization using some electronic means.262
The Security Rule requires organizations to conduct regular risk
analyses to detect potential vulnerabilities to the electronic protected health
253.
45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c)(1) (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 244, at 1, 3.
254.
45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1) (2005); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
255.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244, at 17.
256.
Id. at 17–18.
257.
See id.
258.
Id. at 17.
259.
Id. at 18.
260.
Summary
of
the
HIPAA
Security
Rule,
HHS.GOV,
http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/ (last visited May 2,
2017).
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
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information being stored by the organization.263 The organization then must
work to minimize these vulnerabilities.264 Organizations must have protocol
in place to detect and prevent malicious software from infecting their
computer systems.265 Users of healthcare organization computer systems
must be trained on how to protect their systems against malicious software,
as well as reporting any suspicions that malicious software has infected one
of the organization’s systems.266 The Security Rule also requires healthcare
organizations to use access controls, allowing only necessary users to have
access to electronic protected health information.267 The Security Rule
requires organizations to conduct a risk analysis of all threats to any
electronic protected health information generated by the organization or its
affiliates to determine if any electronic protected health information is in
jeopardy of theft, exposure, or loss.268 Covered entities must also ensure that
their entire workforce is in compliance with the Security Rule.269
Although the Security Rule is somewhat similar to the Privacy Rule,
in its application to electronic protected health information, the Security Rule
does require two additional broad measures regarding health information.270
First, organizations must maintain the integrity of electronic private health
information under the Security Rule.271 Integrity is defined by the Security
Rule as ensuring that the electronic protected health information is not
destroyed or altered without authorization.272 The Security Rule also
requires organizations to maintain electronic protected health information’s
availability.273 Availability is defined by the Security Rule as maintaining
the accessibility and usability of electronic protected health information.274
The Security Rule further requires covered entities to conduct a risk
analysis, which must include several components.275 The analysis must
identify possible threats to electronic protected health information and assess
263.
264.
supra note 260.
265.
supra note 260.
266.
267.
268.
260.
269.
270.
271.
note 260.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2), (e); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
45 C.F.R. § 164.304 (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
Id.
Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.304.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
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the impact of such threats, as well as the likelihood that they will occur.276
The organization must develop measures to deal with the risks identified. 277
The measures taken to deal with security threats must be recorded. 278
Finally, the organization must maintain the security measures
implemented.279
In order to ensure that these provisions are applied and upheld,
healthcare organizations are required to name a security official whose role is
to ensure that their organization is following through on these procedures.280
Covered organizations are required to implement policies authorizing only
certain staff members to have access to electronic protected health
information.281 Organizations must train and supervise all personnel
handling electronic protected health information.282 If a member of an
organization’s staff violates the organization’s internal safeguards, the
organization must issue appropriate sanctions.283 Organizations must
periodically review their procedures and ensure their staff is in
compliance.284
The Security Rule also provides for a number of provisions designed
to ensure the physical safety of electronic protected health information.285
Organizations must ensure their physical facilities, where they keep the
equipment storing their electronic protected health information, are secure.286
Covered entities must also ensure that only authorized personnel are able to

276.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2)(iv) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security
Rule, supra note 260.
277.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security
Rule, supra note 260.
278.
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1), 164.316(b)(1) (2015); Summary of
the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
279.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
280.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
281.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(4)(i); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
282.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5)(i); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
283.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
284.
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra
note 260.
285.
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)–(d) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
286.
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
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access devices storing electronic protected health information.287 Further, the
entity must have policies in place designed to protect its electronic protected
health information during its “transfer, removal, disposal, and re-use.”288
The HIPAA Security Rule imposes a number of technical safety
measures, including access controls, which allow only certain users to access
systems containing electronic protected health information and only for
certain purposes.289 Organizations also must install hardware, software, or
other methods designed to record how the information is being used and
accessed by the organization.290 Steps must be taken to ensure that the
information is not destroyed or modified without authorization, as well as
steps taken to ensure the information is monitored to ensure it is not
destroyed or modified.291 Finally, the Security Rule requires organizations to
take steps to ensure that electronic protected health information is secured
and protected when being transmitted electronically.292
4.

The HIPAA Breach Notification Rule

As an additional incentive to avoid putting electronic protected
health information at risk, and to put those negatively affected on alert,
HIPAA provides for a number of rules requiring healthcare organizations to
notify different parties in the case of a breach.293 These provisions make up
HIPAA’s Breach Notification Rule.294 The Breach Notification Rule applies
to all protected health information, not only electronic protected health
information.295 Under title 45, section 164.402 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, a breach is defined as: “[T]he acquisition, access, use, or
disclosure of protected health information in a manner not permitted, . . .
which compromises the security or privacy of the protected health
information.”296 Any impermissible use of protected health information is
note 260.

287.

45 C.F.R. § 164.310(b)–(c); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra

288.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260; see also 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.310(d)(i)–(iv).
289.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)–(e) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
290.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
291.
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(c); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
292.
Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
293.
See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–.414 (2015).
294.
Id.; Breach Notification Rule, HHS.GOV, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forprofessionals/breach-notification/ (last visited May 2, 2017).
295.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.400.
296.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402.
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presumptively a breach requiring notification, unless the covered entity is
able to demonstrate that there is a low likelihood the protected health
information was actually compromised based on several factors.297 Not
included as a breach under the rule are:
(i) [a]ny unintentional acquisition, access, or use of
protected health information by a workforce member or person
acting under the authority of a covered entity or a business
associate, if such acquisition, access, or use was made in good
faith and within the scope of authority and does not result in
further use or disclosure in a manner not permitted [by the rule];
(ii) Any inadvertent disclosure by a person who is authorized to
access protected health information at a covered entity or business
associate to another person authorized to access protected health
information at the same covered entity or business associate, or
organized healthcare arrangement in which the covered entity
participates, and the information received as a result of such
disclosure is not further used or disclosed in a manner not
permitted [by the rule]; [and] (iii) A disclosure of protected health
information where a covered entity or business associate has a
good faith belief that an unauthorized person to whom the
disclosure was made would not reasonably have been able to retain
298
such information.

If a covered entity commits a breach that involves unsecured
protected health information, the entity is required to make disclosures to the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, any individuals who may
be affected by the breach, and, depending on the circumstances, to the public
through the media.299 Unsecured protected health information is defined as
“protected health information that is not rendered unusable, unreadable, or
indecipherable to unauthorized persons through the use of a technology or
methodology [as] specified” by the Department of Health and Human

297.
164.402(2).

Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; see also 45 C.F.R. §

(1) The nature and extent of the protected health information involved,
including the types of identifiers and the likelihood of re-identification; (2) [t]he
unauthorized person who used the protected health information or to whom the
disclosure was made; (3) [w]hether the protected health information was actually
acquired or viewed; and (4) [t]he extent to which the risk to the protected health
information has been mitigated.

45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2)(i)–(iv).
298.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402(1)(i)–(iii).
299.
Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a)
(2015).
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Services.300 Covered entities must only disclose to the media if over 5002
residents of a certain jurisdiction are affected by an entity’s breach.301
B.
Best Practices for Healthcare Organizations to Avoid Ransomware
Attacks
Of course, never ending up in a situation where one has to negotiate
with a ransomware hacker is the most effective means of protecting a
healthcare organization’s information and resources.302
The U.S.
government has encouraged that systems administrators and computer users
take certain preventive steps to lower the risk of a successful ransomware
attack.303
1.

Backup—and Then Backup Your Backup

Backing up all electronic data to a secured backup location can
prevent a terrible situation from becoming a nightmare.304 A healthcare
organization with a secured, isolated backup at an isolated location can
restore its computer system in approximately four hours.305 These backups
should be tested and assessed annually to ensure they can deal specifically
with a ransomware threat.306 Once a computer is infected with ransomware,
the virus can move between computers using the same network, which is
why it is imperative to store backup data outside of the original network to
ensure it also would not be exposed to the virus.307 External backups can be
stored in a cloud-based system or stored in physical form.308

5.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

45 C.F.R. § 164.402(2)(iv).
45 C.F.R. § 164.406(a).
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3, 5.
Id. at 3–4.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

305.
Id.
306.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4.
307.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4.
308.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4. Although, there are variants of
the ransomware virus that are capable of infecting backups located on cloud-based storage
systems if those systems regularly back up the original system automatically. Id. at 6. This
method of automatic back up from a cloud-based system is referred to as persistent
synchronization. Id. at 4. Healthcare organizations with a persistent synchronization back up
network may want to consider utilizing a separate back up network as well. See id.
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Controlling Access to Operating Systems

Perhaps not every healthcare organization staff member requires
access to the organization’s shared network to perform their tasks and,
therefore, access to the network can be limited based on priority. 309
Administrative access to shared networks should only be granted if necessary
and limiting the use of access can reduce the window of opportunity that a
ransomware hacker has to infiltrate the network.310 Access controls can also
be used to limit the files a user is able to access, thus controlling the potential
danger zones a user can access.311
3.

Monitoring Inbound and Outbound Emails

Although newer versions of the ransomware virus no longer require
an employee to open a dangerous email, the older virus is still being used and
other viruses are also dispatched in this manner.312 Known as phishing
emails, these treacherous emails only pose a threat if they are opened by an
employee.313 While training and awareness programs can be effective at
reducing the risk of an employee opening these false emails, some hackers
are very skilled at making the emails appear authentic and important.314
Along with a prevention training program, healthcare organizations should
take efforts to ensure these emails never reach their employees in the first
place.315 Spam filters can be enabled to detect these malicious emails, and
authentication technologies are available to detect emails being sent from
unknown locations.316 System administrators should also monitor inbound
and outbound emails for suspicious activity.317

5.

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

314.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3. Hackers have used a virus
variant that sends an authentic-appearing email to an employee, listing that employee’s
employer as the sender. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5. The unsuspecting employee is more likely to open an urgent, yet spam, email from their
boss than they are to open an email from an anonymous or unfamiliar sender. Id.
315.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
316.
Id. Among these different verification programs are “Sender Policy
Framework (“SPF”), Domain Message Authentication Reporting and Conformance
(“DMARC”), and DomainKeys Identified Mail (“DKIM”).” Id.
317.
Id.
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Human Error Is the Greatest Risk

Although not all versions of the ransomware virus depend on human
action, many versions infect computers by deceiving computer users into
clicking links or opening emails.318 One of the simplest preventive steps a
healthcare organization can take to defend itself from ransomware attacks is
to inform its personnel of the risk posed by ransomware, common methods
by which the virus is used to infect computers; and actions to avoid while
using a healthcare server, such as clicking on advertisements, browsing
unnecessary websites, or opening emails that seem in any way suspicious.319
A training and awareness program specific to the threat of ransomware,
along with periodic reminders, can go a long way toward preventing an
attack.320
5.

Cyber-Defensive Measures

As mentioned previously, some variants of ransomware are able to
breach an organization’s shared network due to vulnerabilities or unpatched
areas in the system’s network.321 The risk of this type of ransomware variant
being successful can be mitigated by employing a patch management system
to detect and prevent holes in the system’s network.322 Other more common
methods of defending computer systems include setting up firewalls that
block unknown IP addresses and ensuring anti-virus and anti-malware
settings are set to scan for threats.323
6.

How HIPAA Helps

If complied with, HIPAA’s numerous provisions can aid a healthcare
organization in protecting itself from ransomware and all other
cyberattacks.324 HIPAA’s Security Rule requires organizations covered by
the law to implement a risk assessment plan and to actively minimize the
cybersecurity risks identified in the plan.325 The Security Rule also requires
covered organizations to train personnel with access to electronic protected
health information and to designate a security official in charge of managing
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
supra note 260.

DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 2.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 3.
Id.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 244, at 4.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule,
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access to electronic protected health information.326 Further, the Security
Rule requires covered organizations to impose access controls regarding
which employees may access this information.327
HIPAA’s Enforcement Rule gives the law teeth by imposing
disclosure requirements on organizations which experience certain types of
breaches pertaining to their stored protected health information.328 The
Enforcement Rule requires healthcare organizations to disclose breaches of
certain magnitudes to the individuals affected, the press, or the
government.329 These penalties encourage healthcare organizations to abide
by HIPAA’s Privacy and Security Rule provisions, which can minimize the
risk of a ransomware attack in the first place.330 These disclosure
requirements will also help to inform individuals affected by a data breach to
enable them to take steps to protect themselves.331
7.

Dealing with a Ransomware Attack

If a computer or operating system is infected with the ransomware
virus, the U.S. Government further suggests the organization take certain
steps to deal with the attack.332 If the virus is detected early enough that it
has only infected one or a small number of computers, those computers
should be disconnected from the organization’s network to prevent the virus
from spreading further.333 If there are computers that have been infected, but
not entirely disabled, these computers should also be disconnected from the
network and shut down.334 If the organization has a backup system, this
should be monitored to ensure it has not been infected by the virus, and if the
backup is connected to the same network as the original system, the backup
should be disconnected from the network.335 The U.S. Government also
recommends that organizations contact the FBI or the Secret Service if they
fall victim to a ransomware attack.336 The organization should then secure as
326.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e), .308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of the HIPAA
Security Rule, supra note 260.
327.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a); Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, supra note
260.
328.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402 (2015); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
329.
45 C.F.R. § 164.402; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
330.
See Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
331.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.402; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294.
332.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4–5.
333.
Id.; see also DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 10.
334.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 4; see also DUNBRACK, supra note
19, at 10.
335.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5; see also DUNBRACK, supra note
19, at 11; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
336.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
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much of its uninfected system as possible and change any passwords
associated with the network, if possible.337 Finally, the U.S. Government
does not recommend paying ransoms to ransomware hackers.338
8.

The Role of Law Enforcement

The U.S. Government recommends that organizations infected with
ransomware make contact with law enforcement.339 Law enforcement, such
as the Secret Service or the FBI, may be able to tap into resources able to
help the organization, to which the organization—acting alone—would not
have access.340 One such resource would be the international law
enforcement community, which can aid in tracking down international
hackers or foreign variants of the virus.341 While notifying law enforcement
may seem futile or embarrassing in ransomware cases, law enforcement
officials have been successful in several ransomware cases.342
Despite these best practices, all organizations face a strong
possibility of being attacked successfully by a ransomware hacker.343
Healthcare organizations, along with each and every one of their users, must
be vigilant at all times to prevent these attacks, whereas, a ransomware
hacker only has to get lucky once.344 This state of constant defense does not
bode well for healthcare organizations with the result being that sooner or
later many organizations will find themselves negotiating with ransomware
hackers.345
C.
Negotiation Solutions to the Ransom Problem: The Ransomware
Context
If ransomware hackers are able to infect a healthcare organization’s
system with the virus, the organization is faced with two options: (1) pay the

5.

337.
338.

Id.
Id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note

339.
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
340.
Id.
341.
Id.
342.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16. For example, in mid-2014 the U.S.
Department of Justice was able to takedown an entire malware system being used to launch
ransomware attacks. Id. This system was known as Gameover ZeuS. Id.
343.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
344.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
345.
See 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note
5.
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ransom or (2) do not pay the ransom.346 Paying the ransom is the only
realistic hope of having the virus removed from the system. 347 However,
paying the ransom with the hope that the virus will be lifted rests on a
number of assumptions.348 First, if the virus depends on a decryption key to
unlock the infected computer, the organization is assuming that if its pays,
the hacker will give it the decryption key.349 Second, the organization
assumes that if it is given the decryption key, it will actually work and
remove the virus.350 Third, the organization assumes that if the decryption
key is provided and effectively removes the virus, that the virus will be
removed from all of its systems and not just some of its systems. 351 Fourth,
the organization assumes that the ransomware hacker will not simply hack it
again after seeing their efforts rewarded.352 On the other hand, refusing to
pay the ransom would result in practically zero chance of lifting the virus,
which, when dealing with healthcare organizations, can result in lost time,
resources, and patient information, all of which can be especially critical in
the healthcare context.353 However, this may be an acceptable loss if the
proper protocols have been adhered to.354
As discussed in the context of piracy above, the various interests of
the opposing parties in the ransomware context must also be considered and
each outcome predicted when deciding whether or not to pay ransom
demands.355 The successfully hacked healthcare organization may either pay
the ransom or refuse to pay the ransom.356 The successful hacker may either
release the hostage computer system, along with all of its data, or refuse to
release the system, leaving it infected and unusable.357 The only win-win
situation here occurs where the healthcare organization pays the ransom and
the ransomware hacker releases the computer system.358 The healthcare
organization will regain its ability to function and provide healthcare services
346.
Id.
347.
Id.
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
350.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
351.
Id.
352.
Id.
353.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16.
354.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 9–11; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
355.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; see also supra Section III.E.
356.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
357.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
358.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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and the ransomware hacker will have realized his or her financial goal.359 A
second resolution arises where the healthcare organization decides to pay the
ransom demand, but the ransomware hacker refuses to release the computer
system from the virus, despite the payment.360 This resolution plays out
fairly often, unfortunately, since ransomware hackers are not the most honest
of criminals, making payment of ransom demands a less-than-appealing
option.361 This is a lose-win situation for the hospital and the hacker,
respectively.362 The next outcome, in which the healthcare organization
decides not to pay the ransom demand and the ransomware hacker chooses to
release the hostage computer system, is a win-lose outcome favoring the
healthcare organization and will almost never occur because the ransomware
hacker has already succeeded in attacking the organization’s computer
system and, therefore is in a superior bargaining position in which he or she
unlikely would act contrary to his or her own interest.363 The final
outcome—in which the healthcare organization chooses not to pay the
demanded ransom, and the hacker chooses not to release the hostage
computer system—is a lose-lose scenario in which the organization will not
recover its lost system functioning, and the hacker will not realize his or her
financial goal.364
359.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
360.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
361.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
This was the case where a ransomware hacker successfully infected a Kansas-based hospital
with the ransomware virus. Id. The hospital chose to pay the ransom, likely hoping that the
first outcome would occur where the hospital regains functioning of its computer systems and
the hacker is satisfied with their reward. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5; see also Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330. However, instead of
honoring their agreement, upon receiving the ransom sum, the hacker released only part of the
hospital’s operating system. 10-Minute Guide to Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. The
hacker then demanded further ransom payments to release the rest of the system—a
significant portion of the system—from the ransomware virus. Id. Thus, while hoping to
achieve the first outcome of the possible resolutions to a ransom negotiation, this negotiation
ended up reaching the second outcome, in which the hospital pays the ransom and the
ransomware hacker refuses to release the computer system from the virus. See Bento, supra
note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. This is a losewin situation for the hospital and the hacker, respectively. See Bento, supra note 1, at 326,
330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
362.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
363.
Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
364.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 321, 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
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Similar to the context of piracy, this outcome-based framework for
analyzing ransomware negotiations is insufficient on its own for several
reasons.365 As in the piracy context, each option cannot be given equal
weight because the outcome in which the healthcare organization does not
pay the ransom, and the ransomware hacker releases the computer system
will almost certainly not occur—the outcome in which the healthcare
organization pays the ransom and the hacker does not release the parts of, or
the entire computer system, is a possibility and has occurred in the past—and
the situation where the healthcare organization pays the ransom, and the
hacker releases the computer system, is actually not a win at all for the
healthcare organization; in fact, it is a serious loss.366 The healthcare
organization will have lost resources for the amount used to pay the hacker
for the downtime suffered during the negotiation and—worst of all—for any
stolen protected patient information.367
However, if the healthcare
organization has adhered to the best practices for preventing a ransomware
attack prior to being attacked, it will have backed up all of its electronic
information onto a separate server, safe from the ransomware attack.368 This
action would mitigate the potential damage if the organization chooses not to
pay the ransom and does not recover the system controlled by the hacker.369
A system backup would further allow the organization to recommence
operation much faster than would be possible if the organization engages in
negotiations with the hacker.370 This scenario makes the lose-lose outcome
more appealing, especially considering that at any point after a ransomware
hacker takes control of a computer system, a hacker could steal protected
patient data.371 Thus, under any of the four outcomes, protected patient data
could be stolen, resulting in a significant loss for the healthcare organization
and its patients.372
365.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; supra Section III.E.
366.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5; supra Section III.E.
367.
Beek, supra note 14.
368.
DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; 10Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
369.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
370.
See DUNBRACK, supra note 19, at 11; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. In fact, if the
organization engages with and pays a ransomware hacker, the organization may never regain
control over its stolen computer system. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
371.
See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
372.
See Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
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Arguments in Favor of Paying Ransoms to Ransomware Hackers

The arguments in favor of paying ransoms to pirates and terrorists
are similar to the arguments in favor of paying ransoms to ransomware
hackers, including: The possibility of recovering the hostage data and the
notion that ransom negotiators should not limit their options by removing the
possibility of paying ransoms.373 However, the digital nature of the hacker
ransom demand transaction can allow hackers to back out on their side of the
agreement with greater ease than a pirate, or terrorist, who takes people
hostage.374 Where both sides of a ransom negotiation are entirely digital, the
possibility of recovering the hostage data decreases substantially.375
2.

Arguments Opposed to Paying Ransoms to Ransomware Hackers

Once again, the arguments in the contexts of piracy and terrorism are
similar to the arguments opposed to paying ransoms to ransomware hackers,
including: The idea that ransom payments will only further the ransomware
hacking enterprise; the argument that paying a ransomware ransom may
expose the organization as vulnerable and willing to pay out, which
encourages future ransomware attacks; and the argument that ransomware
hackers may simply accept the ransom payment and sell off the ransomed
data on the black market.376 These arguments are compelling in greater part
because they have been proven accurate based on ransomware attacks on
healthcare organizations in the past.377 However, imposing an outright ban
on healthcare organizations paying ransom payments to ransomware hackers
would unnecessarily deprive negotiators of a valuable option in the
negotiation.378 Further, there may be nothing to be gained by depriving
healthcare organizations of the right to pay ransom to ransomware hackers
because these hackers will have an incentive to use the virus and demand
ransom, even if they are fully aware that healthcare organizations are banned
from paying them.379 The hackers still have an incentive to hack the
373.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 326, 330; Dubner & Chavers, supra note 126,
at 317–19, 327; Weill, supra note 8, at 200, 204–05.
374.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
375.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 289; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
376.
Bento, supra note 1, at 288–89; Dutton & Bellish, supra note 118, at 309–
11; Weill, supra note 8, at 192, 194, 197; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware
Protection, supra note 5.
377.
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
378.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
379.
Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
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organizations to steal their valuable, protected patient data and they still may
demand ransom payments, hoping that the organizations will pay regardless
of the ban, perhaps in order to make the problem go away quietly.380
D.

Alternative Solutions to the Ransomware Problem

Although an outright ban on ransom payments to ransomware
hackers may be too restrictive of an option for negotiators, other alternative
solutions can be employed to help combat the issue using the legal
landscape.381
1.

A Heightened Terrorist-esque Interest for Ransomware Negotiations

As mentioned above, the problem of terrorism has been accorded a
heightened interest, which is used by many countries to justify an all-out ban
on ransom payments to terrorists, as well as enabling several other practices
considered too extreme to use in response to other crimes.382 The idea
behind this heightened interest is that terrorism is a uniquely difficult
problem that cannot be solved using conventional methods alone.383
Whether the threat posed by ransomware necessarily rises to the level where
it would warrant an all-out ban on ransom payments need not be answered
because of the unique electronic nature of the entire ransomware transaction,
and the incentive of ransomware hackers to use the virus in order to steal
protected patient data resulting in no beneficial purpose to be gained by an
all-out ban on ransom payments.384
2.

Imposing a Tax on Ransomware Payments to Be Used for AntiHacking Efforts

An alternative method of reducing the incentives of ransom
negotiators to pay the ransom—and of hostage takers to take hostages to
begin with—is to impose a tax on ransom payments made, with the proceeds
being used to combat the ransomware problem.385 This solution has been
discussed in the context of piracy ransom negotiations.386 In the ransomware
380.
381.

Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16; Hagland, supra note 14.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
382.
Weill, supra note 8, at 180–81.
383.
Id. at 181.
384.
See Gifford, supra note 1, at 60–62; Reynolds, supra note 132, at 612–13;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5.
385.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
386.
Id.
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context, a federal tax could be imposed on all ransom payments made to
ransomware hackers and the proceeds could be used to fund federal efforts to
prevent cyberattacks.387 Such a tax reduces the incentive of healthcare
organizations to pay ransoms to ransomware hackers because doing so would
result in them having to pay an additional sum on top of the ransom
payment.388 The tax also reduces the incentive of ransomware hackers to
demand ransom from these organizations because doing so will indirectly
fund government efforts aimed at preventing cyberattacks in the first
place.389 The major shortfall of this alternative approach is that healthcare
organizations may become even less likely to report ransomware incidents to
avoid the imposed tax.390
3.

Prohibiting Insurance Coverage for Ransomware Attacks

Insurance companies have been offering coverage to companies and
individuals facing ransom situations, such as K&R policies in the terrorism
context.391 Noting the rising threat of cyber-hacking in today’s world, many
different forms of cyber insurance are now available.392 Cyber-insurance
seeks to cover insured entities for the cost of digital loss and repair following
Healthcare
a cyberattack on the insured’s computer network.393
organizations have an incentive to purchase cyber insurance as coverage can
aid an organization financially in recovering from a debilitating attack. 394
387.
See id. at 332–33.
388.
See id. Reducing the incentive of healthcare organizations to pay ransoms
to hackers, hoping to ensure that their lost network will be functioning, is an important goal
considering how often healthcare organizations pay the ransom demand and the ransomware
hackers refuse to restore the organization’s network or make additional ransom demands. See
id.; 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5. Further, once a
healthcare organization pays a ransom demand, it may be seen by other hackers as vulnerable,
increasing the likelihood that they will be attacked again. 10-Minute Guide to Healthcare
Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
389.
Bento, supra note 1, at 332.
390.
See Bento, supra note 1, at 332; CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 5;
10-Minute Guide to Healthcare Ransomware Protection, supra note 5.
391.
Clendenin, supra note 220, at 750.
392.
See Jean Bolot & Marc Lelarge, Cyber Insurance as an Incentive for
Internet Security, in MANAGING INFORMATION RISK AND THE ECONOMICS OF SECURITY 269,
273 (M. Eric Johnson ed., 2009); RUPERTO P. MAJUCA ET AL., THE EVOLUTION OF
CYBERINSURANCE 2 (2006); Kathleen Richards, Is Cyberinsurance Worth the Risk?,
TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/feature/Is-cyberinsurance-worth-the-risk
(last updated Aug. 2014).
393.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra
note 392, at 3; Richards, supra note 392.
394.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra
note 392, at 2–3; Richards, supra note 392.
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However, many organizations choose not to purchase cyber-insurance
because, among other reasons, the organizations do not want to disclose that
its system has been compromised following an attack, because doing so may
expose the organization as vulnerable to future attacks.395
Although some would argue that ransom-based insurance policies
promote security, since the occurrence of successful cyberattacks are nearly
inevitable, others argue that this type of coverage only lulls covered
organizations into a false sense of security and results in the organization
failing to implement other appropriate safeguards to prevent ransom
situations from arising.396
The major difference here between the
ransomware context and the contexts of terrorism and piracy is that
ransomware hackers may obtain something of value from healthcare
organizations merely by taking the organization’s system hostage: Protected
patient information.397 Unlike human hostage situations, where the criminals
are only successful if their ransom demands are met, ransomware hackers are
still successful even if their demands are not met.398 Cyber-insurance can
help a healthcare organization regain a functioning network in the face of an
attack, but the organization still has every incentive to take other steps to
protect its system because cyber-insurance typically does not help the
organization with respect to HIPAA claims and other liability due to lost
patient data.399
4.

Requiring Healthcare Organizations to Pass Annual CyberInspections and Employ Cyber-Guards

HIPAA already places several requirements on healthcare
organizations pertaining to its electronic protected health information,
including a requirement that the organization conduct regular risk analyses
on its electronic security measures.400 This requirement could be expanded
to require healthcare organizations to pass an annual cyber-inspection every

395.
See Richards, supra note 392.
396.
See Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 277; MAJUCA ET AL., supra note
392, at 2–3; Clendenin, supra note 220, at 750–51; Richards, supra note 392.
397.
See CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8; Zimmerman, supra note 5,
at 16.
398.
See Weill, supra note 8, at 205–07, 217; Zimmerman, supra note 5, at 16;
CCIPS WHITE PAPER, supra note 12, at 8.
399.
Bolot & Lelarge, supra note 392, at 270–71; MAJUCA ET AL., supra note
392, at 2–3; Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294; Richards, supra note 392; Summary of
HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
400.
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(1) (2015); see also Breach Notification Rule,
supra note 294; Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
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year by an authorized institution.401 Such a requirement would push
healthcare organizations to ensure its electronic protected health information
is protected to clear inspection.402
Further, an alternative solution raised by some in the piracy context
is to require ship-owners to employ guards on their vessels when they know
their crew is being sent into pirate-infested waters.403 This solution could be
applied to the ransomware context by requiring healthcare organizations to
employ electronic data protection experts to conduct regular performance
reviews of a healthcare organization’s security measures.404
5.

A Process-Structural Approach to Ransomware Ransom Payment
Decision-Making

An alternative solution proposed in the terrorism context, as opposed
to an outright ban on ransom payments to terrorists, is what is described as a
process-structural approach.405 The process-structural approach to ransom
payments requires a clear legal standard determining when, and how the
decision to pay a ransom demand will be reached.406 The approach requires
a distinct group of decision-makers to reach a consensus privately as to
whether or not they will agree to the ransom demand.407 Finally, the human
and personal factors involved are taken into account, with those who will be
affected by the decision being given the opportunity to be heard by the
decision-makers.408 The process-structural approach is ideal in the terrorism
or even the piracy context because it allows an existing decision-making
body, a democratic government, to reach a contemplated consensus while
promoting both transparency behind its approach, as well as a private means
of reaching a decision.409
Unfortunately, this approach would be
inapplicable to the context of ransomware because the approach requires
decision-makers to engage in a lengthy process of discussion in order to
401.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294;
Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
402.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(c); Breach Notification Rule, supra note 294;
Summary of HIPAA Security Rule, supra note 260.
403.
Bento, supra note 1, at 331–32.
404.
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2) (2015); Summary of HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260. HIPAA already requires covered organizations to designate an individual in
charge of ensuring the organization complies with HIPAA-required safeguards pertaining to
protected patient information. 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2); Summary of HIPAA Security Rule,
supra note 260.
405.
Weill, supra note 8, at 217–18.
406.
Id. at 218.
407.
Id. at 217.
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Id. at 217–18.
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Id.
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reach a consensus, which cannot work in the face of a ransomware attack
where a virus is employed that steals protected patient data over time.410
VI.

CONCLUSION

The threat of ransomware likely will only increase as the virus is
modified to overcome cyber-defenses in the healthcare industry, which
seems to continually struggle to keep up with technological advancements.411
Despite the persistence of ransomware hackers, understanding the
preemptive steps healthcare organizations can take to protect their electronicprotected patient information and complying with HIPAA’s other, numerous
requirements will ideally protect healthcare organizations from many
ransomware attacks.412 If and when, however, these defenses fail and a
hacker is successful at infecting a healthcare system with the ransomware
virus, understanding the advantages and disadvantages of various
negotiation-based approaches can help the organization manage the crisis as
best as possible.413 Further, there are ways that the legal landscape can be
changed to better fight the ransomware problem.414 Alternative methods
such as taxing ransom payments, imposing stricter cyber testing
requirements, and requiring inspections by experts in the cyber security field
can be helpful legal tools to curb the ransomware problem without depriving
negotiators of the option to pay the ransomware hacker’s demands or, at
least, allow the hacker to believe the organization may pay his or her
demands.415 These options demonstrate how different approaches, such as
the negotiation theory approach, can be utilized to better understand and
fight the growing ransomware menace.416
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